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When American judges and lawyers take a vacation in England,
they usually manage to slip away from the usual round of sightsee-
ing and shopping expeditions long enough to take a look at one or
two English courts. This is justified on the basis that the courts
themselves are a spectacle, as much so as the Tower of London or
Picadilly Circus or the Horse Guards at Buckingham Palace. It is
also justified on the theory that an American lawyer may learn
something useful about the administration of justice and the prac-
tice of law by watching an English court at work.
However, unless an American who visits an English court has
some background in English legal institutions, he may come away
disappointed. It is not enough for him to recognize that American
law is built upon a foundation of English law The separation be-
tween the two legal systems took place three to four hundred years
ago and immense changes have taken place on both sides of the
Atlantic since then. Nor is it enough that England and the United
States have common traditions, common ideals, common problems,
and a more or less common language. Without some understanding
of the English legal system as a whole and of the judges and lawyers
who operate it, a spectator is likely to come away from his visit to
an English court shaking his head, marvelling at how similar prob-
lems can be handled so differently in the two legal systems, and with
a blurred impression that English lawyers dress in a peculiar fashion
* This article is based upon two lectures given by Professor Karlen as the 19th Annual
Edward G. Donelly Memorial Lectures conducted at the West Virginia University Law Center
on April 4, and 5, 1979.
** Tazewell Taylor Visiting Professor of Law, College of William and Mary; Professor
Emeritus of Law, New York University; A.B., University of Wisconsin, 1934; LL.B., Colum-
bia University, 1937. Member, New York Bar, Wisconsin Bar.
The author is greatly indebted to the Right Honorable Lord Diplock and to Professors Doug
Rendleman and Frederick F Schauer, both of the Marshall-Wythe School of Law of the
College of William and Mary, for reading this article in manuscript form and offering many
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and speak with strange accents. If so, our American spectator might
as well have been visiting courts in Paris, Moscow, or Peking. All
he will carry back home is the remembrance of a spectacle. But if
he starts with some preliminary understanding of what he is looking
at, he will find his legal visits meaningful and thought-provoking.
It is the purpose of this Article to supply some of the necessary
background, much in the way that a tour guide on a sightseeing bus
explains to the passengers what they are looking at as they pass this
monument and that building.
THE COURT OF APPEAL
The most instructive appellate tribunal for the American judge
or lawyer to visit is the Court of Appeal for two reasons. First, it is
the closest English equivalent to the American appellate courts.
Second, it occupies such a central place in the English system that
if we look closely at it, we can hardly fail to gain a fair insight into
the administration of English justice in general.
The Court of Appeal is housed in a building called the Royal
Courts of Justice, located in the heart of legal London. It provides
quarters not only for the Court of Appeal, but also for the English
High Court whose judges handle the most important cases for the
entire nation. Surprisingly, the building is not as big or as elegant
as many local American courthouses which, instead of serving the
entire nation or an entire state, serve only a single county or a single
city
The Court of Appeal is the basic appellate court in England. Its
decisions are subject to further review in the House of Lords, but so
few cases reach that tribunal that for almost all civil and criminal
cases in England and Wales, the Court of Appeal is the court of last
resort.' It consists of two divisions, civil and criminal. Until 1966
these were two separate courts, operating with different personnel
and according to different procedures. Now they are merged into a
single tribunal, but most of the old differences persist.2
1. The procedure for seeking review in the House of Lords is by applying for "leave to
appeal," which is roughly the equivalent of asking for a writ of "certiorari" from the Supreme
Court of the United States. In 1975 only twenty-seven appeals from the Civil Division of the
Court of Appeal and seven from its Criminal Division were heard and disposed of in the House
of Lords. K. EDDEY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 45 (2d ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as K.
EDDEY].
2. Criminal Appeal Act of 1966. Compare, R. JACKSON, THE MACHINERY OF JUSTICE IN
ENGLAND 206 (7th ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as R. JACKSON].
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In this country, we treat civil and criminal cases pretty much
alike, but in England there are marked differences between the way
the two types of cases are handled. Civil cases are tried by perma-
nent, full-time, professionally trained judges. Those involving a
small amount in controversy go to a County Court, which we would
describe as a trial court of limited civil junsdiction.3 Those involving
a larger amount in controversy go to the High Court, which we
would describe as a trial court of general jurisdiction.' Review is
available as a matter of right in the Civil Division of the Court of
Appeal, 5 also staffed by permanent, full-time, professionally trained
judges.6
Criminal cases receive far less time and attention from profes-
sional judges. The vast majority of them, over ninety-five percent,
are tried in the magistrate's court by part-time, unpaid judges who
are not professionally trained as lawyers. 7 Only the most serious
prosecutions, comprising less than five percent of the total criminal
case load,8 go before a professional judge sitting with a jury in what
is called the "Crown Court."9 It is only from this court that appeals
reach the Criminal Division of the Court of Appeal. But appeal is
3. A. KIRALFY, THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 234-38 (6th ed. 1978) [hereinafter cited as A.
KnIALFY].
4. Anyone who wants to bring a civil action has to consider whether the
appropriate court is a county court or the High Court. A few special matters
must be brought in a county court, but apart from such cases there is concurrent
jurisdiction, the High Court being able to hear everything that can come before
a county court as well as everything that is outside county court limits. But
plaintiffs are discouraged from suing in the High Court when there is no reason
why the county court should not be used.
R. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 35. See K. EDDEY, supra note 1, at 38-39. There are three civil
divisions in the High Court: Queen's Bench, Chancery, and Family.
5. A. KiRALFY, supra note 3, at 239.
6. K. EDDEY, supra note 1, at 20. See D. KARLEN, APPELLATE COuRTs IN THE UNITED STATES
AND ENGLAND 83 (1963) [hereinafter cited as D. Karlen].
7. But note: "[R]egular provision is now made for courses of instruction for lay magis-
trates." A. KulALFY, supra note 3, at 162-63, citing Administration of Justice Act 1973 § 3. In
addition there are some stipendiary magistrates: "Such magistrates must be barristers or
solicitors of not less than seven years standing There is an upper limit of 40 stipendar-
ies." Id. at 163, citing § 2(1) and § 2(6) of the Act.
8. In 1974 a total of 55,005 persons were brought for trial in the Crown Court while 1,914,110
were proceeded against in the Magistrates courts. R. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 382-83. Thus
actually only 3% of the prosecutions were in the Crown Court that year. See also R. WALKER,
THE ENGLISH LEGAL SYSTEM 173-74 (4th ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as R. WALKER]; K.
EDDEY, supra note 1, at 57-58. See generally I. SCOTT, THE CROWN CoURT (1972).
9. Id.
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not allowed as a matter of right.'0 A hearing on the merits is granted
only as a matter of judicial discretion in about seventeen percent of
the cases in which leave to appeal is sought." Furthermore, the
Criminal Division has a shifting membership, consisting partly of
judges from the Civil Division and partly of High Court (trial)
judges designated ad hoc to sit for the hearing of criminal appeals
only 12 The only judge who sits regularly in the Criminal Division is
the Lord Chief Justice, but he has many other responsibilities to
absorb his time. He is the administrative head of both the Queens
Bench Division of the High Court and the Crown Court, and he
sometimes sits as a trial judge.'3
PERSONNEL
Our concern is with the Civil Division. In order to avoid awkward
language, I shall refer to it simply as the Court of Appeal. A good
starting point is to identify the cast of characters in a typical civil
appeal.
The judges are easy to identify from their place in the courtroom.
Three of them are seated behind the bench. The Court of Appeal
sits in panels of three, not en banc with its full membership, as is
the custom in many American courts." This means that four or five
10. A convicted person may appeal from the Crown Court to the Criminal
Division of the Court of Appeal. He must give notice of doing so within 28 days
of conviction or sentence. He may appeal against conviction on a point of law
as a matter of right, but to appeal against conviction on a point of fact or a
mixed question of law and fact he must have the leave of either the trial judge
or the Court of Appeal If he appeals against sentence he will always
require the leave of the Court of Appeal and there are other restrictions upon
his right of appeal.
K. EDDEY, supra note 1, at 72-73.
11. R. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 207.
12. A. Kw.ALFY, supra note 3, at 152. See K. EDDEY, supra note 1, at 58-59.
13. D. KARLEr, supra note 6, at 106-08. Cf. K. EDDEY, supra note 1, at 58-59; A. KnIAFY,
supra note 3, at 152.
14. Kiralfy states:
A quorum consists of any three members of the 16 permanent judges of the
court, i.e. the Master of the Rolls and 15 Lords Justices of Appeal. They are
appointed by the Crown on the advice of the Prime Minister and must have been
High Court Judges or be of 15 years' standing at the Bar. Members appointed
since 1959 retire at the age of seventy-five. The Lord Chief Justice and the
President of the Family Division sometimes sit in the Court. A High Court judge
may be asked to sit as third judge if the court has a temporary spate of appeals.
Hence the court may sit in five divisions at once, if necessary. It usually consists
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other appeals may be going on simultaneously in other parts of the
courthouse. The judges look pretty much like American appellate
judges. They are men of mature years dressed in black robes, only
slightly more elaborate than the American version. The only differ-
ence immediately noticeable is that the English judges wear wigs.
The lawyers are not so easily identifiable. Two of them, facing the
judges and doing most of the talking, are dressed very much like the
judges themselves-in black robes and grey wigs. These are barrs-
ters.
Seated behind them in the first row of spectator seats are other
persons dressed m ordinary civilian clothes who appear to be in-
volved in the proceedings. They do not speak out loud or address
the judges directly, but they frequently whisper to the barristers and
hand papers to them. They are solicitors.
In England there are no all-purpose lawyers like those in the
United States. An English lawyer must be either a solicitor or a
barnister; he cannot be both simultaneously 15 American lawyers
tend to identify themselves with barristers, but most of them are
mistaken in doing so. Functionally, the typical American lawyer is
much more like a solicitor.
Solicitors
A solicitor is the closest English equivalent to what we would call
a general practitioner."6 He can undertake any type of legal work,
and, unless it involves litigation at a high level, follow it through to
its conclusion. He drafts wills, contracts, and leases, organizes and
dissolves corporations, conveys title to real estate, administers es-
tates, and so forth." He also conducts civil litigation m the County
of three of the permanent members, occasionally five or seven. The Law Lords
may sit and one court consisted of three Lords of Appeal in Ordinary.
Id. at 239-40.
15. Webster, The Bar of England and Wales: Past, Present and Future, in LEGAL INSTrrU-
TIONS TODAY 84, 91 (H. Jones ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Webster]. The situation is not
likely to change within the foreseeable future. The report of the Royal Commission on Legal
Services declared "it is in the public interest for the profession to be organized, as at present,
in two branches." Wall St. J., Oct. 4, 1979, at 14, col. 3.
16. See generally Bowron, Solicitors and the Law Society, in LEGAL INSTrUTioNS TODAY 109
(H. Jones ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Bowron]; K. EDDEY, supra note 1, at 1-2, 7-9; R.
JACKSON, supra note 2, at 419-26; R. MEGAIRY, LAWYER AND LMGANT IN ENGLAND 12-13 (1962)
[hereinafter cited as R. MEGARRY]; R. WALKER, supra note 8, at 211-24.
17. Id.
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Courts and criminal litigation in the Magistrates' Courts. These
courts of limited jurisdiction, although at the bottom of the judicial
pyramid, are extremely important because of the volume of litiga-
tion they handle. In these courts, the overwhelming majority of all
cases, civil and criminal, are started and finished. We must be
careful, therefore, not to think of solicitors only as office lawyers.
They can and do try many cases.'8
The only function a solicitor cannot perform is to conduct litiga-
tion in the higher courts, including the Court of Appeal. For this he
needs the services of a barrister. 9 But the client whose case is to be
presented is the solicitor's, not the barrister's. A client cannot di-
rectly retain a barrister, 10 so he must bring whatever legal problems
he has to a solicitor in the first instance. The solicitor makes it his
business to know which barristers are competent to handle which
kinds of cases, and if proceedings in the High Court or the Court of
Appeal are necessary, he chooses a barrister whose skills and fees
are suited to the case at hand.2 1 In short, the barrister is retained
by the solicitor, not the client. Employment is on an ad hoc basis,
case-by-case. There are no continuing retainer arrangements be-
tween solicitors and barristers. 22
The solicitor does more than retain the barrister who is to act as
advocate. He also participates in the litigation. By the time a case
reaches the stage of appeal, the facts are embodied in the record on
appeal, but, originally, the facts were worked up by the solicitors on
both sides. Barristers try cases but do not prepare them.2 The job
of interviewing witnesses and collecting relevant documents is done
by the solicitors. They embody their data in a document called a
"brief"2' 4-note the difference in English and American meanings of
18. Id.
19. Webster, supra note 15, at 91, 96.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 97.
22. Id. at 100.
23. Webster, supra note 15, at 96, 97.
24. Brief:
In English practice. A document prepared by the attorney and given to the
barrister, before the trial of a cause, for the instruction and guidance of the
latter. It contains, in general, all the information necessary to enable the barns-
ter to successfully conduct their client's case in court, such as a statement of
the facts, a summary of the pleadings, the names of the witnesses, and an
outline of the evidence expected from them, and any suggestions arising out of
the peculiarities of the case.
BLACK's LAW DICTIoNARY 240 (Rev. 4th ed. 1951).
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this term-submitted to the barrister. The solicitors also sit in at
the trial, feeding relevant documents, memoranda, etc. to their re-
spective barristers and thus become intimately familiar with what
the record contains. It is this knowledge which enables them to
assist at the appellate level as well as at trial.
A person is trained to become a solicitor by a combination of
apprenticeship and formal education. The apprenticeship is served
in a solicitor's office, with the apprentice assisting in whatever needs
to be done and being paid a salary On-the-job training is supple-
mented by formal education in a law school run by the Law Society
A college degree is not a prerequisite to entering the school or to
being admitted to practice, although one who holds a degree is
allowed to serve a shorter period of apprenticeship and to take fewer
formal courses."
The Law Society is the central professional organization for solici-
tors. Its headquarters building is located within a block of the Royal
Courts of Justice. Membership in it is voluntary, but most solicitors
belong."8 It is a club offering dining rooms, a library, and various
social facilities, but it is more than a club. It regulates not only the
education of solicitors, but also their admission to practice and their
discipline, whether they are members of the Society or not.Y In
addition, it administers England's well developed and publicly fi-
nanced system of legal aid for indigents.28
Once admitted to practice, a solicitor can set up an office for
himself or enter into partnership with other solicitors, and he may
specialize in particular areas of law There are about 30,000 practic-
ing solicitors at present, well-scattered throughout the cities and
towns of the nation and, thus, readily available to clients who need
their services.29
25. Bowron, supra note 16, at 113. But see K. EDDEY, supra note 1, at 3: "[F]rom 1980
entry into the students ranks of the profession will be limited to those who have obtained a
degree." Id.
26. 85% of the solicitors are members. R. WALKER, supra note 8, at 211.
27. The Solicitors Act of 1974. In some respects the Law Society functions like an inte-
grated bar in some American states.
28. Id. § 36, Sch. 2; R. WALKER, supra note 8, at 212. See also Bowron, supra note 16, at
122-23.
29. Bowron, supra note 16, at 113.
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Barristers
Turning to the other branch of the legal profession, barristers are
very few in number compared to solicitors. There are only about
4,200 in all of England"0 and most of them, about seventy percent,
have their offices, which they call "chambers," within a block or two
of the Royal Courts of Justice.3 ' That is because the bulk of their
work is litigation in the High Court and the Court of Appeal, where
they have the exclusive right of audience. Most barristers are spe-
cialists in litigation. They spend day after day in court trying cases
or arguing appeals, sometimes within a specialized area of law like
torts or contracts. 3 A few become so highly specialized in a particu-
lar branch of substantive law that they devote most of their time to
advising solicitors, often rendering formal, written opinions. 31 Most
barristers, however, are what we would call specialist courtroom
lawyers.
Each barrister is a solo practitioner. He cannot form a partner-
ship with any other barrister or with any solicitor. What he can and
almost always does do, however, is to share office space and expen-
ses with a half dozen or more other barristers.34 Each case he handles
comes to him from some solicitor, because the barrister cannot deal
directly with lay clients.31 This means that the choice of a particular
barnister to handle a particular case is an informed choice, made by
a professional who appreciates the skills needed for competent advo-
cacy In the United States, where any lawyer can handle any case
at any level of court, and where the choice of an advocate is ordinar-
ily made by the lay client who has no way of judging competence,
we have a different situation. Some American judges, particularly
those who sit on appellate courts, feel that they are not getting the
help they need from the lawyers who appear before them and are
30. K. EDDEY, supra note 1, at 1, states the number of barristers in 1977 to be 3,646, but a
recent letter to the author by Lord Diplock puts the present number "between 4100 and
4200."
31. The Inns of Court, where most barristers have their offices, are about one mile north
of the Central Criminal Court (popularly known as "Old Bailey") where the Crown Courts
m London sit. Barristers are also active in these courts, so that their offices are readily
accessible to both criminal and civil courts where their services are performed.
32. See generally K. EDDEY, supra note 1, at 7; R. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 426-48; R.
WALKuE, supra note 8, at 224-30; Webster, supra note 15, at 97, 99-100.
33. "[T]lhs is known as 'taking counsel's opinion.'" K. EDDEY, supra note 1, at 7.
34. Webster, supra note 15, at 95.
35. Id. at 91; see K. EDDEY, supra note 1, at 1.
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seeking ways to improve the quality of advocacy 36
A person who wants to become a barrister follows a path parallel
to that of one who chooses to become a solicitor, but it is a separate
path. Again, both formal legal study and apprenticeship are re-
quired; but the formal part of the training is conducted under the
auspices of the Inns of Court, and the practical part takes place in
a barrister's office. Thus, the training of members of both branches
of the legal profession is firmly in the hands of practitioners, not
professors. 7
The Inns of Court are four professional organizations,38 and every
barrister must belong to one.39 Like the Law Society, they too are
more than clubs. They control the education of barristers, their
admission to practice, and their discipline. In addition to dining
halls, libraries, and other facilities open to all their members, each
has a number of buildings which are rented out for offices and
apartments. Most barristers occupy office space m a building owned
by one of the Inns of Court, all of which are within a few minutes'
walking distance of the Royal Courts of Justice.
Before leaving barristers and solicitors, one should compare their
numbers with the numbers of their American counterparts. Alto-
gether England has about 35,000 lawyers for a population of about
55,000,000 or one lawyer per 1650 people. The United States has
about 400,000 lawyers for a population of about 220,000,000 or one
lawyer per 550 people. In other words, the United States has three
times as many lawyers per capita as England."
36. E.g., Burger, The Special Skills of Advocacy: Are Specialized Training and Certifica-
tion of Advocates Essential to Our System of Justice? 42 FoRDHAm L. Rav. 227 (1974); Kauf-
man, Does the Judge Have the Right to Qualified Counsel? 61 A.B.A.J. 569 (1975).
37. Webster, supra note 15, at 95-96; Bowron, supra note 16, at 113. See also K. EDDEY,
supra note 1, at 2-3; A. KIRALFY, supra note 3, at 276-77; R. MEGARRY, supra note 16, at 94-
108. Because of England's system of legal education, there is a much wider gulf between
practicing lawyers and law teachers than exists in the United States.
38. They are: Gray's Inn, Inner Temple, Lincoln's Inn, and Middle Temple.
39. R. WALKER, supra note 8, at 224. See also R. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 426-28.
40. "The Bureau of the Census reported in August that the U.S. population was
216,817,000 as of July 1, 1977." THE WORLD ALMANAC AND Boox OF FACTS 34 (G. Delvry ed.
1978) [hereinafter cited as WORLD ALMANAC]. Population of United Kingdom (1977 est.) is
55,900,000. Id. at 585. There are 29,900 solicitors, see supra note 29; and 4,100 barristers, see
supra note 30, for a total of 34,000. U.S. lawyers and judges total 413,000 (1978 est.), U.S.
INFORMATION PLEASE ALMANAC (3d ed. 1978).
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Judges
Almost without exception, the judges on the Court of Appeal have
served previously as trial judges on the High Court and, before that,
as litigating barristers for at least ten years. They are specialists in
litigation with much experience.4' The same cannot be said of Amer-
ican appellate judges, who are drawn from a variety of backgrounds.
Some have previously served as trial judges, but many come directly
from general practice, others from non-judicial political office, oth-
ers from academic life, and so forth.4" Moreover, English judges are
not elected, but appointed from the ranks of barristers on the recom-
mendation of the Lord Chancellor, a former barrister who occupies
the highest judicial office in the land. Party politics plays no part
in their selection.4 3 What counts is a man's professional performance
and reputaton as seen by his fellow barristers and the judges before
whom he practices. Together they constitute a small, close-knit
community, for the judges remain members of the Inns of Courts
which they joined as barristers, and they continue to eat, drink, and
socialize with their former colleagues. Everybody within this com-
munity knows who's who and who would be likely to become a good
judge."
Like barristers and solicitors in England, judges are few in num-
ber. There are only sixteen judges in the Civil Division of the Court
of Appeal,4" serving a population of fifty million people in all of
41. D. KARLEN, supra note 6, at 83-84. See R. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 461.
42. See Goldman, Judicial Backgrounds, Recruitment, and the Party Variable: The Case
of the Johnson and Nixon Appointees to the United States District and Appeals Courts, 1974
Amiz. ST. L.J. 211.
43. R. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 470.
44. The English system of selecting judges is not without its drawbacks:
Criticism of the judiciary usually takes the form that the social and educational
background of the persons appointed to be judges is so similar that the judiciary
is inevitably out of sympathy with modem social tendencies, and has long failed
to have any understanding of the working conditions, attitudes of mind and
aspirations of the mass of the population. It is certainly true that most of the
High Court and Appeal Court judges received a public school education followed
by legal studies at Oxbridge and then call to the Bar.
K. EDDEY, supra note 1, at 18. See R. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 471.
Generally speaking, baristers too, constitute an elite profession, not open as a practical
matter to persons of humble origin and low economic status. The elitism of the bar from
whence all the superior tribunal judges are chosen, is inevitably reflected in the English
judiciary. Compare, N.Y. Times, March 18, 1979, at 38, col. 1.
45. See note 14 supra.
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England and Wales. This compares with sixty-three appellate
judges in the state courts of California alone, 46 serving a population
of about twenty million. 7 If one divides the number of California
judges by two on the assumption that they devote half their time
to criminal cases, it becomes apparent that California has twice as
many appellate judges hearing civil appeals as England. Adding
together all appellate judges serving in the fifty states and all appel-
late judges in the federal system, leaving out of consideration only
the Supreme Court of the United States, one arrives at a figure of
94811 judges serving a population of roughly 220 million people.',
Cutting that number in half, again on the assumption that they
devote half of their time to criminal cases, there are 474 American
appellate judges doing civil work compared to the sixteen on the
English Court of Appeal; per capita the United States has six times
as many appellate judges doing civil appeals as England has. This
disparity in numbers cannot be explained in terms of population
alone. One must seek further explanations in the different appellate
procedures in the two nations and in their caseloads, which differ
both in volume and nature.
APPELLATE PROCEDURE
To one observing an English civil appeal, the proceedings appear
very slow and leisurely There is no fixed time limit on oral argu-
ment." On the average, a civil appeal lasts about a day and a
quarter, but it could run for several days or several weeks.51 This is
in marked contrast to the time allowed for oral argument on an
appeal in the United States, where fifteen minutes, a half hour, or
at most an hour is normally the maximum allowed for each side.12
Even in the Supreme Court of the United States, where the most
significant and difficult cases are heard, each side is normally al-
46. COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, STATE COURT SYSTEMS 2 (1978); F. KLEI, FEDERAL AND
STATE COURT SYSTEMS-A GUIDE 14 (1977).
47. In 1970, the population of California was 19,953,134. WORLD ALMANAC, supra note 40,
at 226.
48. STATE COURT SYSTEMS, supra note 46; see 28 U.S.C. §§ 44, 171, 211, 251 (1976); 10
U.S.C. § 867 (1976).
49. WoRL ALMANAC, supra note 40, at 34.
50. D. KARLEN, supra note 6, at 95.
51. Id.
52. See FED. R. App. P 34.
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lowed no more than one half hour of oral argument. 53 Paperwork is
the prime characteristic of American appellate procedure whereas
orality is the hallmark of English appellate procedure.
The barrister we are observing reads aloud from time to time from
the record of trial of the proceedings below-sometimes from the
opinion of the judge below, sometimes chunks of testimony, some-
times a contract, lease, or other document that was admitted into
evidence. 4 This would not be tolerated in an American appellate
court, where one of the judges would almost surely stop the lawyer
and remind him that judges are perfectly capable of reading for
themselves. Each English judge has a copy of the record before him,
but he probably has not looked at it in advance of oral argument,15
and for reasons that will be discussed below, he will have no oppor-
tunity to look at it later. While counsel is reading aloud, the English
judges may be simultaneously scanning the record themselves so
that whatever is in it can enter their minds through ears or eyes or
both.
One of the features of an English record on appeal not ordinarily
found in an American record on appeal is a reasoned opinion by the
judge below 11 Trial by jury in civil cases has virtually disappeared
in England. Cases are almost always tried before a judge, sitting
without a jury 17 The opinion of the trial judge summarizes the facts,
defines the issues and how they were resolved, and cites the authori-
ties he considers controlling. 8 In the rare case where a jury is used,
the judge in his instructions summarizes the evidence and com-
ments on it, in addition to explaining the principles of law to be
applied. 9 Thus, both in jury and non-jury cases, appellate judges
in England have the advantage of starting with a thoughtful judicial
analysis of the case before them. American appellate judges, at least
53. SUP. CT. R. 44.
54. D. KARLEN, supra note 6, at 93-94. See also Leggatt & Williams, Contemporary Litiga-
tion in England, in LEGAL INSTITUTMNs TODAY 185, 202 (H. Jones ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited
as Leggatt & Williams].
55. D. KARLEN, supra note 6, at 93.
56. Id. at 92.
57. There were 3 jury trials in 1976. A. KmAY, supra note 3, at 122-23, 238; and currently,
less than 1% of the civil cases have juries. R. WALKER, supra note 8, at 207-08. About the only
type of case tried by jury m England today are defamation cases, and there are precious few
of those.
58. D. KARLEN, supra note 6, at 92.
59. R. WALKER, supra note 8, at 309.
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those functioning at the first level of review like the English Court
of Appeal, ordinarily have no such assistance from below 10 If the
case has been tried by jury, they have the judge's instructions, but
too often these consist only of abstract principles of law not closely
tied to the facts of the particular case. Most American trial judges
cannot or will not comment on the evidence, or even summarize it
for fear of unduly influencing the jury 11 If the case has been tried
without a jury, the judge's decision is likely to be expressed in stilted
"findings of fact and conclusions of law" so formal and abstract that
they seldom give a clear and straight-forward picture of what the
case is about.12 English appellate judges and the barristers who
appear before them are given more help. They have a head start in
the form of a readable judicial synopsis of the case to be decided
on appeal.
From time to time, the barrister reads aloud from legal authorities
upon which he is relying-a statute or a case or two. This also would
not be tolerated in an American court. The judges would say in
effect, "We will get those authorities from your brief and read them
for ourselves." In England, there are no written briefs, so the judges
must learn all they are going to learn about the case while the oral
argument is in progress; this explains why there are bookshelves
lining the courtroom walls. When a case is cited by counsel, a bailiff
goes to the bookshelves and gets three copies of the volume contain-
ing the case and gives one to each of the judges. Again they may look
at the case themselves while listening to counsel reading it aloud.
Again they are able to absorb what is needed either through their
eyes or their ears or both.
Fortunately not too many cases are cited. Partly this is because
relatively few opinions are published, as will be explained below.
Partly it is because the judges and barristers are always specialists
in litigation, and some of them are also likely to be specialists in the
area of substantive law under consideration.63 The body of English
60. For some American civil appeals, there is a reasoned opinion from the court below,
especially when there has been a written pre-trial or post-trial motion (e.g., a motion to
dismiss, or for summary judgment, or for a new trial, or for judgment notwithstanding the
verdict).
61. JUDICIAL COUNCIL OF TE STATE OF NEW YORK, 5TH ANNUAL REPORT 187 (1939); VANDER-
BILT, MINIMUM STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 221 (1949).
62. Cf. Roberts v. Ross, 344 F.2d 747 (3d Cir. 1965).
63. Webster, supra note 15, at 100.
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case law is so small that the judges are likely to know the relevant
cases without having to be told about them.
The judges do not supinely accept whatever counsel has to say
about the authorities on which he relies or about the record. They
actively participate in the process of reasoning, seeking to under-
stand the facts and the legal principles applicable to them as the
argument proceeds, for they realize that as soon as oral argument
is concluded they will have to announce their decision from the
bench orally
The judges question counsel extensively and freely discuss the
facts and the law, not worrying about revealing the trend of their
thinking."4 They do not try to look or act like Sphinxes. Sometimes
a judge directs questions or comments to counsel not so much to get
their reaction as to get the reaction of the other judges. Sometimes
the judges whisper between themselves on the bench, or, if there is
a recess for lunch, they discuss the case as they walk together to or
from one of the Inns of Court where they are dining. The whole
proceeding is conducted informally The method is Socratic, not
unlike the dialogues that take place between professors and stu-
dents in American law schools. Watching the judges and barristers
at work, one has the impression that he is observing the meeting of
a committee of five, only three of whose members-the
judges-have voting power. The non-voting members, meaning the
barristers, are not bashful about expressing their views, although
they sometimes do so in a code language that is hard for Americans
to follow If, for example, a judge should pursue a line of reasoning
that one of the barristers considered erroneous, the barrister might
begin his response by saying, "With respect, my lord, I should like
to point out ," and then express a contrary line of thought.
Translated, this would mean "I disagree." If the barrister prefaced
his remarks by saying, "With great respect, my lord," that would
mean he strongly disagreed. If he started with the words "With the
greatest respect, my lord," that would mean that the barrister
thought the judge had taken leave of his senses.65
Although there are no fixed time limits for oral argument, the
64. D. KARLEN, supra note 6, at 93-94.
65. I am indebted for this description to the late Professor A. C. Goodhart, Master of
University College, Oxford. American observers sometimes think that barristers are too defer-
ential to the judges to the detriment of their clients. They may be right in so thinking.
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judges, in an informal manner, see to it that time is not wasted. For
example, if a barrister should cite a case for a proposition that was
obvious, one of the judges would probably say, "We accept that
proposition. Please proceed." Or if the barrister should begin to
repeat himself needlessly, one of the judges might say, "Thank you,
Mr. Smith. We understand your position and we won't trouble you
to develop that point any further.""
The most striking instance of informal control occurs when coun-
sel for the appellant has completed what he has to say without
convincing any of the judges that there is anything wrong with the
judgment below. In such a situation, the judges would probably hold
a whispered conference on the bench. If all three were convinced
that there was no reason to reverse or modify the judgment below,
the presiding judge would say to counsel for the opposing side as he
stood up to make his argument, "Mr. Jones, we won't need to hear
from you" and then proceed to deliver orally and extemporaneously
his opinion, affirming the judgment.6' Each of the other judges
would state his concurrence, adding whatever additional remarks,
if any, he considered appropriate. The case would be finished, and
the next case on the list called for argument. This does not happen
often, but the fact that it can and sometimes does happen illustrates
the kind of control that the judges exercise over oral argument.
Despite their leisurely manner, English judges are not prone to
waste time in hearing and deciding appeals.
If, as is more commonly the case, counsel for the appellant has
raised some doubt in the mind of at least one of the judges as to the
correctness of the decision below, the case proceeds. Counsel for the
appellee now makes his oral argument, trying to dispel whatever
doubts were raised by opposing counsel and to convince the court
that the decision below should stand. The same basic procedure is
followed as was followed during the appellant's presentation: the
record and legal authorities are cited and read aloud, the judges
participate in the discussion, and the committee of five is at work
again.
When counsel for the appellee has completed his oral argument,
counsel for the appellant has the right to reply, which he is likely
to exercise very briefly. In practice, however, oral argument in the
66. D. KAxLEN, supra note 6, at 94-95.
67. Id.
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Court of Appeal has little resemblance to a formal debate in which
one side takes the affirmative and the other the negative. Instead,
there is a running three-sided dialogue between the judges and
counsel for both parties. Judges ask questions and make comments,
switching back and forth between opposing counsel for their reac-
tions.
As soon as counsel for both sides have finished speaking, the
judges reach their conclusion in a whispered conference on the
bench, and the presiding judge delivers his opinion, affirming, re-
versing, or modifying the judgment below This is done orally and
extemporaneously, the judge speaking only from whatever notes he
has made during the argument. Then each of the other judges
speaks, concurring or dissenting and giving his reasons.6 8 This case
is now finished. The judges have probably spent six or seven hours
on it.
Occasionally, in a difficult case, instead of deciding immediately
from the bench, the judges reserve decision until the following
morning or, if a weekend intervenes, until the start of the next
week-rarely longer than that. 9 This gives them time to reflect
further, and if one of them thinks it useful, he may reduce his
opinion or key parts of it to writing. When the court reconvenes the
following day or the following Monday, each judge orally delivers his
opinion. However, the usual procedure in a normal case is for the
judges to deliver their opinions extemporaneously, immediately
upon the close of oral argument.
English appellate procedure goes a long way toward avoiding two
evils sometimes observed in American appellate courts. One is the
failure of all judges to participate fully in all decisions. In England,
where the judges are being observed while they work and where
each is expected to express his own views, a "one man opinion,"
rubber-stamped by the other judges, is unlikely 7o The other evil is
basing a decision upon grounds or authorities not urged or subject
to challenge by either side.7' This is possible in the United States,
68. Id. at 98-99.
69. Id. at 99.
70. Cf. P CARRINGTON, D. MEADOR, & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 29-32 (1976).
71. Id.
72. For a judge to consult and rely upon authority not cited by counsel is considered
improper by the English bench and bar generally. The English approach seems to be based
on the unstated premise that counsel on both sides are fully and equally component-a very
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where the judges work mostly behind closed doors, but hardly pos-
sible in England, where the judges reach their conclusions in full
view of opposlrig counsel, their solicitors, their clients, and what-
ever other spectators may be present from the press or.the general
public.7 2 In short, English judges operate as if they were subject to
a "sunshine law,"7 3 whereas American judges act as if they had
never heard of that peculiarly American invention.
What explains the differences between the way an appeal is han-
dled in England and the way it is handled in the United States?
Scheduling Appeals
An important factor is the way appeals are scheduled for hearing.
In the United States, the typical appellate court hears six or seven
cases a day for four or five days running and then adjourns for about
a month to write opinions disposing of those cases." First, a closed
conference is held to take a tentative vote on how each case shall
be decided, and the cases are parceled out for opinion writing. Case
#1 goes to Judge A, case #2 to Judge B, and so forth. The ideal is a
single opinion for the entire court, but if that ideal cannot be at-
tained, the next best thing is to have as few concurring or dissenting
opinions as possible. 5 One of the judges who voted with the majority
in a particular case will be assigned to write the opinion of the court
for that case, and one who voted with the minority will be assigned
to write the dissenting opinion. 78 Conferences are held between
judges in person, by telephone, or by inter-office memoranda in an
attempt to reach agreement both as to substance and language.7
Sometimes, however, a draft that started out to become the unani-
mous opinion for the court ends up as a dissent; and one that started
out to be a dissent becomes instead the opinion of the majority ,8
doubtful premise. To the extent that it is false, the quality of English judicial opinions is
reduced to the quality of advocacy.
73. "As the popular name suggests, these laws are designed to open up governmental
decision making to public view and participation." Little & Thompkins, Open Government
Laws: An Insider's View, 53 N.C.L. REv. 451 (1975).
74. See, e.g., Brown, State of the Federal Judiciary in the Fifth Circuit, 8 CuMB. L. REV.
441 (1977); Hennessey, State of the Judiciary, 62 MAss. L.Q. 7 (1977).
75. See Moorehead, Concurring and Dissenting Opinions, 38 A.B.A.J. 821, 824 (1952).
76. See Haines, Rolling Back the Top on Chief Justice Burger's Opinion Assignment Desk,
38 U. Prrr. L. REv. 631 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Hames].
77. Id.
78. In some jurisdictions the practice of rotation has been exalted to a cardi-
nal principle; judges have been called upon to write an opinion for the majority
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Sometimes the differences between the judges are so great that each
judge ends up writing his own opinion." However many opinions
may be written, whether one or several, they are slow in coming.80
When finally ready, they are not read aloud in open court or even
announced there, but simply filed with the clerk of court.8 ' Then
they are routinely published.8 1 Many months, sometimes years,
elapse between the oral argument in a given case and the promulga-
tion of the court's opinion disposing of it.13
In England, the scheduling of appeals follows a very different
pattern. Cases are heard and decided one at a time. English appel-
late judges sit on the bench five days a week, from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m.
and from 2 p.m. to 4.15 week after week.84 Unlike their American
counterparts who spend most of their working hours in their cham-
bers conferring with their law clerks and fellow judges, studying
briefs, reading cases, dictating to secretaries, and revising drafts of
opinions, English judges spend almost all their working hours in
open court. They have no law clerks and no secretaries, for none is
needed. Conferences between judges take place on the bench or
while walking to and from court. There is no pressure on them to
agiee on common language, because each is expected to speak his
own mind.88
Orality & Paperwork
Another explanation of why the English Court of Appeal operates
as it does is that there are no written briefs.87 In England, appellate
of the court with which they did not agree, but then they have been permitted
to accompany such a majority opinion with a dissenting opinion of their own,
expressing their true views.
Vanderbilt, Improving the Administration of Justice-Two Decades of Development, 26 U.
CINN. L. REv. 155, 257 (1957).
79. E.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (death penalty case); New York Times
Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) ("Pentagon Papers" case).
80. In Furman, more than five months elapsed between oral argument and decision. 408
U.S. 238 (1972).
81. E.g., 2D Cm. R. § 0.20. But see id. § 0.23.
82. E.g., 3D Cm. R. 13.
83. See AMERIcAN JUDICATURE SocIm, SOLUTIONS FOR APPELLATE COURT CONGESTION AND
DELAY: ANALYSIS AND BIBLIOGRAPHY 2 (1963).
84. D. KARLEN, supra note 6, at 82.
85. See Haines, supra note 76.
86. See note 84 supra.
87. D. KAPLEN, supra note 6, at 93.
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procedure is primarily, almost exclusively, oral.8 Dispensing with
briefs has several important consequences. First, cases can reach the
stage of oral argument more quickly in England than in the United
States. The appellant is not required to draft a lengthy and elabo-
rate written argument, serve it on the opposing party, and file it in
court.8 9 Neither is the appellee. Nor, of course, is there any occasion
for a written reply by the appellant. The elimination of these steps
reduces the time that elapses between the rendition of judgment in
the trial court and the hearing of the appeal. In the United States,
the interval can be very long, frequently a year or more." The ab-
sence of written briefs also saves time for the lawyers and expense
for their clients.9 Anyone who is accustomed to both speaking and
writing realizes how much quicker and easier it is to prepare and
deliver a speech from notes than it is to write it out and revise every
word for publication. Writing is laborious and painful to most peo-
ple. Speaking is faster, more natural, and often more effective. Fur-
thermore, the lawyer writing an appellate brief in the United States
is ordinarily subject to frequent interruptions while he attends to
other cases for which he is responsible and other aspects of his law
practice. Seldom can he give his undivided attention to an appellate
brief alone.
The time of the judges too is saved by dispensing with written
briefs. They consider an appeal only once in a single concentrated
burst of effort and then they are finished with it. American judges,
on the other hand, typically consider an appeal several times on
isolated occasions. First, they read the briefs for a given case in
advance of its oral argument. This is not a universal practice, but
it is becoming more and more common, and today is accepted as the
proper procedure for appellate judges. 2 Second, they hear oral argu-
88. Id. The English tend to deplore the American approach: "We are implacably
opposed to any further reduction in orality. It is an American disease which needs to be
eradicated, particularly in appellate courts." Leggatt & Williams, supra note 34, at 203.
89. For an example of American practice, see, e.g., FED. R. App. P 28, 31.
90. See, e.g., Heydebrand, The Context of Public Bureaucracies: An OrganizationalAnaly-
sis of Federal District Courts, 11 LAW AND Soc. REv. 759, 791 (1977) [hereinafter cited as
Heydebrand].
91. Whether written briefs, American style, result in a higher quality of total advocacy
(written and oral combined) and ultimately in a higher quality of judicial decision (greater
d~pth, more careful analysis) is debatable. Cf. D. KARLEN, supra note 6, at 149-50. But
compare Leggatt & Williams, supra note 54, at 202-03.
92. A.B.A. COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STANDARDS RELATING TO
COURT ORGANIZATION § 3.34 (1974).
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ment in the case, but by this time they may have forgotten most, if
not all, of what they learned from their initial reading of the briefs,
because in the meantime they have been hearing oral arguments in
other cases, reading briefs in other cases, and finishing up opinions
in still other cases left over from their previous sitting. Third, when
one of the judges is assigned to write an opinion on the case, he
needs to study the briefs again, but by this time he may have forgot-
ten both the oral argument and his initial reading. In the meantime,
his attention has been distracted by other cases in which he has
been hearing oral arguments and reading briefs, drafting other opin-
ions of his own, and examining opinions drafted by his fellow
judges." Many months may pass between the time of oral argument
and the time when the decision is handed down.94
If one added the total amount of time spent by an American judge
handling an appeal and compared it with the total amount of time
spent by an English judge handling the same kind of appeal, the
figures might be surprising. Assuming that a hypothetical English
case takes a day and a quarter, or roughly seven and a half hours of
court time, and that in a hypothetical American case of the same
difficulty and complexity, oral arguments take one hour, the ques-
tion arises as to how much additional time is spent before and after
argument in the study of briefs and the writing of opinions. My
guess is that it would be not less than six or seven hours. No one is
sure, of course, because judges don't punch time clocks. If that guess
is reasonably accurate, however, a judge on the English Court of
Appeal does not spend any more time on a given case than does his
American counterpart, and over the course of a year probably dis-
poses of just as many cases. The leisurely pace of English appellate
judges as they are observed in the courtroom is deceiving.
Deploying Judicial Manpower
Another factor making for English efficiency is the economical use
of judicial manpower. Although the Court of Appeal as a whole is
composed of sixteen judges, it sits in panels of three. 5 The three
93. American law clerks to appellate judges promote some continuity of attention to partic-
ular cases, but the fact remains that judicial attention is necessarily sporadic. See, e.g.,
Haines, supra note 76, at 633; COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE
SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL PROCEDURES: REcOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 51 (1975).
94. See, e.g., Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972); Heydebrand, supra note 90.
95. See note 14 supra.
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judges who hear a given case decide it finally, without any possibil-
ity of a rehearing and without involving other judges." Some Ameri-
can appellate courts, notably the United States Courts of Appeal,
also operate in panels of three. 7 However, in these courts rehearings
are possible. 8 They are often sought and occasionally granted,
sometimes not just before the original panel of three, but before the
membership of the entire court, involving the energies of a dozen or
more judges. Most American appellate courts do not operate in
panels; all the judges sit en banc.11 If the court is composed of five
or seven judges, about twice the judicial manpower is needed to
dispose of a given case as is needed in England; if it is composed of
nine judges, three times the judicial manpower that England would
devote to the case is needed. Furthermore, in the courts that sit en
banc, rehearings are sometimes granted. ' When this happens, the
amount of judicial manpower devoted to the case is multiplied by
two. These computations are conservative, because the English
Court of Appeal lets each judge state his opinion in his own words,
whereas American appellate courts attempt to secure agreement on
the language of an opinion that expresses a consensus of the views
of all the judges, or at least a majority of them. The more judges
there are to consult, the more time it takes to attempt to secure
agreement among them.
Before reaching any conclusion about the relative efficiency of
English and American appellate judges, one should consider the
kinds of cases they handle. Are the problems presented to the Eng-
lish Court of Appeal basically the same as those presented to Ameri-
can appellate courts or fundamentally different? In addressing this
question, one should consider the legal authorities out of which the
judges in each nation fashion their decisions and the way in which
they conceive their role.
JUDICIAL REVIEW VS LEGISLATIVE SUPREMACY
In both nations, judges have to deal with statutes as well as a
body of common law However, in the United States there is an
additional layer of legal authority which is not present in Eng-
96. D. KARLEN, supra note 6, at 158.
97. 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1976).
98. Id. See also FED. R. App. P 40.
99. Lilly & Scalia, Appellate Justice: A Crisis in Virginia?, 57 VA. L. REV. 3, 22-26 (1971).
100. See, e.g., FED. R. ApP. P 35.
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land-constitutional law
The United States has a written federal constitution and is fully
committed to the proposition that the law embodied in it is so
fundamental that it overrides and renders null and void any incon-
sistent legislative enactments, administrative regulations, executive
orders, or judicial decisions."' Most of us are reconciled to the idea
that the document does not necessarily mean what its framers in-
tended but what the current membership of the Supreme Court of
the United States thinks it should mean in the context of modern
conditions in a changing society "I The original text has been all but
forgotten, and constitutional adjudication proceeds not from the
text but from previous decisions of the Supreme Court. 03 One case
builds upon another until the body of federal constitutional law we
know today is almost wholly judge-made. This has been going on
for more than a century and three-quarters, at least since Marbury
v. Madison was decided in 1803.10°
In addition to the federal constitution, there are fifty state consti-
tutions, which have spawned another impressively large body of
constitutional law These state constitutions are subordinate to the
federal constitution and valid federal law but superior to the enact-
ments of state legislatures, orders of state governors, and regulations
of state administrative agencies. The highest court of each state is
the guardian of the state constitution, and the document means
what the current members of that court say it means.0 5
In England, there is no written constitution and no conception of
judicial supremacy An opposite view prevails-the doctrine of par-
liamentary supremacy What Parliament says, goes. No English
court can frustrate its will. All it can do is to interpret the acts of
Parliament.' If a judicial interpretation does not conform to the
will of Parliament, Parliament can redraft the legislation to make
101. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
102. See A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 177 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as BICKEL].
103. "The association of people is not mentioned in the Constitution or in the Bill of
Rights. The right to educate a child in the school of the parents' choice is also not
mentioned. Nor is the right to study any particular subject or any foreign language. Yet the
First Amendment has been construed to include certain of those rights." Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
104. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
105. Shoener v. Pennsylvania, 207 U.S. 188, 195 (1907); accord, Mount St. Mary's Ceme-
tery Ass'n v. Mullins, 248 U.S. 501, 503 (1919).
106. K. EDDEY, supra note 1, at 107-08. See also A. KiiALFY, supra note 3, at 96.
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it crystal clear. ' After that, the judges have no choice but to apply
the law as written. In other words, contemporary English judges are
not regarded, by themselves or others, as lawmakers."8 It is true that
they can and do legislate interstitially, and it is true that the com-
mon law has been made by judges over the course of many centuries,
but such judge-made law prevails only to the extent that Parliament
allows it to continue. 0 9
In the United States, the combination of written constitutions
and judicial review of legislation greatly complicates the work of
appellate judges. They are required not only to interpret and apply
statutes, but also to pass upon their constitutional validity This
forces them to look not only at the statutes themselves and previous
decisions interpreting them, but also at relevant constitutional pro-
visions and decisions interpreting them. Not infrequently, the
judges must consider not only the specific facts of the case before
them, but also the "legislative facts" which determine whether the
legislature acted reasonably or unreasonably i10 Sometimes they
even feel impelled to implement constitutional provisions by taking
charge of institutions and activities that fail to comply with the
constitutional norms that the judges have declared."' This is one
aspect of "government by the judiciary ,,1 It represents a material
departure from the traditional judicial function of deciding dis-
putes. Deciding a dispute between known individuals about a spe-
cific past event in accordance with established principles of law is
one thing. Solving a broad social problem affecting large segments
of the population for the indefinite future according to formulae still
to be devised is quite another.13
107. R. WALKER, supra note 8, at 79.
108. A. KiRALY, supra note 3, at 93-96. See generally K. EDDEY, supra note 1, at 108, 167;
Templeman, An English View of the Judicial Function, in LEGAL INsTrrUTIONs TODAY 6, 17
(H. Jones ed. 1976) [hereinafter cited as Templeman]; R. WALKER, supra note 8, at 79-110.
109. Id. Cf..
The work done by the Judges of England is not now as glorious as it was
I doubt if judges will now of their own motion contribute much more to the
development of the law. Statute is a more powerful and flexible instrument for
the alteration of the law than any that a judge can wield.
P DEVLIN, SAMPLES OF LAWMAKING 6, 23 (1962).
110. See Aldisert, An American View of the Judicial Function, in LEGAL INSTiTUTIONS
TODAY 31, 41 (H. Jones ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as An American View].
111. E.g., Calhoun v. Cook, 430 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1970) (planning of school sites); Davis
v. Board of School Comm., 402 U.S. 33 (1971) (zoning, reassignment of teachers).
112. R. BERGER, GovERNmENT By THE JuDicARy (1977).
113. Rifkind, Are We Asking Too Much of Our Courts? 70 F.R.D. 96, 103 (1976).
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Constitutional law permeates the rest of our law and converts
what used to be run-of-the-mill disputes into constitutional is-
sues.114 It even converts into constitutional issues grievances that
formerly were considered so trivial that they were ignored or suf-
fered in silence. Here are a few examples. Formerly, if a policeman
assaulted a prisoner, the prisoner could sue for assault and battery
in a local court. Now, he can bring an action in federal court for
deprivation of his civil rights.115 Formerly, if a soldier was told by
his commanding officer to trim his beard, he might grumble, but he
would trim the beard. Now, he is likely to sue his commanding
officer and probably the Pentagon and the Secretary of Defense as
well. ' Formerly, if a young girl wanted to play baseball, she would
assemble a few playmates, go to a sandlot, and play baseball. Now,
she is likely to bring an action to vindicate her right to join the Little
League.' 7
Just as there is no grievance too small to justify judicial interven-
tion, there is also no problem too big for the courts to tackle. If the
schools of Boston are too slow in achieving desegregation, the solu-
tion is simple: turn their administration over to a judge. 18 If the
prisons and mental hospitals of Alabama are depriving some of their
inmates of constitutional rights, the solution is the same: let the
institutions be administered by a judge.' 9 If Senator Barry Goldwa-
ter cannot persuade his colleagues in the United States Senate to
go along with him in blocking President Carter's abrogation of the
treaty with Taiwan, he goes to court.2 '
114. See Aldisert, A Federal Judge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal
Caseload, 1973 ARiZ. ST. L.J. 557, 573-74.
115. Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973) (guard and warden sued).
116. Anderson v. Laird, 437 F.2d 912 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 865 (1971).
117. Fortin v. Darlington Little League, Inc., 514 F.2d 344 (1st Cir. 1975); National Organi-
zation for Women, Essex County Chapter v. Little League Baseball, Inc., 127 N.J. Super.
522, 318 A.2d 33 (1974).
118. Morgan v. Henmgan, 379 F Supp. 410 (D.C. Mass.), aff'd, 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir.
1974), supplemented sub nom. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 388 F Supp. 581 (D.C. Mass.), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F Supp. 216 (D.C. Mass.), stay denied,
523 F.2d 917 (ist Cir. 1975), aff'd, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1976).
119. Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), enforcing, 334 F Supp. 1341
(M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'd in part, remanded in part sub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305
(5th Cir. 1974); James v. Wallace, 382 F Supp. 1177 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Pugh v. Locke, 406
F Supp. 318 (M.D. Ala. 1976), aff'd. sub nom. Newman v. Alabama, 559 F.2d 283 (5th Cir.
1977), cert. dented, 438 U.S. 915 (1978).
120. New York Times, Dec. 23, 1978, at 9, col. 1.
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The cases just discussed have been aptly described as "dinosaur"
cases. 12' They are big not only in the magnitude and complexity of
the problems they present, but also in the number of persons and
organizations that become involved in them, the voluminous data
they engender, and the amount of judicial time they require. 2 2 Some
such cases are class actions, where a few named plaintiffs are suing
on behalf of themselves and hundreds or thousands of persons simi-
larly situated. Others are individual cases which start out from a
narrow dispute but end up as "dinosaurs." One example is Regents
of the Unversity of California v Bakke. 13 By the time Bakke
reached the Supreme Court of the United States, no less than fifty-
nine individuals and organizations had filed amicus briefs. The
case settled the specific dispute presented by ordering the Medical
School to admit Bakke, but it failed to solve the general problem of
affirmative action. It merely discussed the problem and defined
some of the issues, thereby raising hosts of questions to be answered
in future cases.2 4 A similar case was Brown v. Board of Education, '
which indirectly gave rise to the Bakke case. It also settled the
immediate dispute of whether certain black children should be
admitted to an all-white school in Topeka, Kansas, but it failed to
solve the general problem of securing educational opportunities for
blacks equal to those enjoyed by whites. Now, twenty-five years
after the decision was rendered, that general problem is still with
us and in active litigation in both state and federal courts.'26
STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
In both England and the United States, appellate courts have the
job of interpreting statutes. When those statutes are not challenged
on constitutional grounds, as they cannot be in England and as they
need not be in the United States, the task of English and American
judges might appear to be substantially the same. That, however,
is not the case.
English judges are confronted with only one set of domestic stat-
121. An American View, supra note 110, at 68.
122. Id. at 68-73.
123. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
124. See, e.g., Margolis, The Aching 'Bakke'; Is There a Cure? 51 CONN. B.J. 417 (1977).
125. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
126. See BICKEL, supra note 102, at 143-51.
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utes-those passed by Parliament.' 2 Since England has a unitary
rather than a federal government like ours, there are no state stat-
utes to worry about. American judges, working in a system where
sovereignty is divided between the nation and the fifty states, are
often confronted with two or more sets of statutes. A state court is
required under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution to apply
not only state law but also federal law 128 A federal court is required
to apply not only federal law but also, when its jurisdiction is based
upon diversity of citizenship, state law 129 When either a state or
federal court is dealing with events that occurred at some place
other than where the court is sitting, it may be obliged, under con-
flict of laws principles, to interpret and apply legislation that origi-
nated neither in Washington, D C. nor the local state capitol.' 30
English courts also are confronted with conflict of laws problems
when the events they are called upon to deal with occurred outside
of England-perhaps France, Germany, or the United States. '
However, the number of cases involving international conflict of
laws rules is probably very much smaller than the number arising
127. But note:
The membership of the United Kingdom in the European Economic Com-
munity from January 1, 1973 introduced a system of supra-national law, in
accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Rome and the Treaty of Acces-
sion. Legislation has been passed, aimed at fitting these changes into our tradi-
tional system of legal sources and the existing framework of Parliamentary
sovereignty.
Community law, future as well as present, is automatically binding in Eng-
land in many cases without local enactment here. Judicial notice is taken by
our courts of such community law. Orders in Council and Regulations may be
used to implement Community law in matters of detail. In some cases Com-
munity law has no direct effect but requires the United Kingdom Parliament
to pass specific enactments.
Decisions of the European Court as to the interpretation of the treaties and
their effect on community law are binding in England and proved by certified
copies of their judgments. There is also a need to refer some matters to the
European Court.
The impact of these changes is most felt in a wide but limited field, such as
the law of restrictive practices and company law. But the whole of existing
English law inconsistent with the now incorporated Community law is repealed
by implication. English courts have to decide, in the first instance, when this
has happened, which entails their using continental sources.
A. KniALY, supra note 3, at 116-17.
128. U.S. CONST. art. 6, cl. 2.
129. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
130. REsTATZMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 2 Comments, Illustrations (1969).
131. See generally DicEY AND MORRIS, CONFLIrC OF LAWS (8th ed. J. Morris 1967).
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within a single nation and involving intranational conflict of laws
rules.
Moreover, English appellate courts concern themselves only with
the language of the statutes they are interpreting, not with their
legislative history or the social, economic, and political policies
underlying them.'3 2 Whether this is wise or not,'3 3 it simplifies the
work of the judges and is consistent with the English judges' concep-
tion of their limited role. The United States follows a different ap-
proach, partly because legislative history often determines the va-
lidity of statutes challenged on constitutional grounds, but partly
also because it sometimes illuminates the meaning of legislative
language. American judges are expected to understand the evils at
which a statute is aimed and do their part toward helping to stamp
out those evils. They are encouraged consciously to consider the
broad social, economic, and political effect of their decisions. 34 This
approach is consistent with the expansive American conception of
the proper role of judges; we expect judges to participate in the
process of making, as well as applying, law
Finally, English statutes tend to be more specific and detailed
than American statutes. They usually try to spell out the intention
132. English judges do not look at the reports of proceedings in Parliament during the
passage of a legislative act. The standard English approach was stated in Magar & St.
Mellons RDC v. Newport Corp., [1952] A.C. 189, 191:
The general proposition that it is the duty of the court to find out the intention
of Parliament and not only Parliament but of Ministers also cannot
by any means be supported. The duty of the court is to interpret the words that
the legislature has used; these words may be ambiguous but even if they are,
the power and duty of the court to travel outside them on a voyage of discovery
is strictly limited.
(quoted in Templeman, supra note 108, at 22).
Since England joined the European Economic Community in 1973 a new approach to
statutory interpretation has been added, at least insofar as the Treaties are concerned. In
interpreting it the English courts:
[Miust follow the European pattern No longer must they [the English
courts] examine the words in meticulous detail, no longer must they argue
about the precise grammatical sense. They must look to the purpose and intent
They must devine the spirit of the treaty and gain inspiration from it. If
they find a gap, they must fill it as best they can, they must do what the framers
of the instrument would have done if they had thought about it.
Id. at 29, quoting from Lord Denning, M.B., in Bulmer v. Ballinger, [1974] 2 All E. R. 1226,
1237.
133. "A word is not a crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought
and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumstances and the time in
which it is used." Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918) (Holmes, J.).
134. See Friendly, Judges Who Can't and Legislators Who Won't, 63 COLUM. L. Rav. 787
(1963).
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of Parliament in such a way as to leave the judges little leeway in
interpretation. 35 Some American statutes-for example, the Inter-
nal Revenue Code-follow the same pattern, but other American
statutes are very different in nature. For example, the Sherman
Anti-Trust Act simply outlaws "contracts and combinations in re-
straint of trade.' 36 Congress, by this statute, delegates to judges the
whole problem of competition and monopoly, saying in effect, "We
recognize that there is a problem here, but we don't know how to
deal with it ourselves, so we will pass the buck to the judges and
let them decide." Not surprisingly, this statute has spawned an
immense amount of litigation of an extraordinarily complicated and
prolonged nature.'3 7 The anti-trust action now pending in New York
against IBM has been going on for ten years and is still a long way
from decision at the trial court level. 38 Dozens of years may elapse
before it is finally decided. Legal rules for its disposition are not
in existence. They have to be invented. This is problem solving,
not the kind of dispute deciding under known rules that Englishmen
consider the normal work of courts.' 9 American courts, besides hav-
Ing to do the kind of work English courts do, are saddled with the
task of solving broad social problems in accordance with rules yet
to be devised. Despite their law clerks and secretaries, American
judges are not equipped with the personnel and facilities to do what
is demanded of them. They cannot hold legislative-type hearings or,
on their own initiative, conduct the kind of research needed to
formulate intelligently broad policy "I Legislatures are better
equipped to solve such problems, but they are so imbued with the
idea of judge-made law that they often delegate their lawmaking
functions to the courts. The anti-trust statute is but one example
among many of legislation which merely furnishes a starting point
for a large body of judge-made law The original Civil Rights Act is
another."' It prohibits discrimination, but it does so in terms almost
135. Cf. Templeman, supra note 108, at 23.
136. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1976).
137. An American View, supra note 110, at 69-70.
138. Id. at 70-71.
139. See note 132 supra; see also Friendly, supra note 134.
140. BICKEL, supra note 126, at 175.
141. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1976).
142. Constitutional rights, such as those guaranteed by the first ten amendments and the
fourteenth amendment, are rights of individuals and minorities against the majority. Since
the majority, as represented in Congress, ought not to be allowed to define and redefine the
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as vague as the language of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution itself. The job of defining discrimination in detail and
devising means to deal with it is left to the courts.4 2
THE COMMON LAW
Both English and American courts are guided by earlier judicial
decisions. Here at last one might expect to find the raw materials
basically the same in both countries, but again there are differences.
English case law is not nearly as voluminous as American case
law England has a single judicial system for the entire nation,
whereas the United States has fifty-one, one for the federal govern-
ment and one more for each of the fifty states. Each contains at least
one appellate court, and many have intermediate appellate courts
as well as a supreme court. The federal system has eleven such
courts;"4 intermediate appellate courts also exist in California, New
York, Illinois, Texas, Michigan, Pennsylvania, Ohio, and many
other states.' The volume of decisional law emanating from all
these tribunals is staggering compared to the volume of decisional
law that the English Court of Appeal has to apply It needs to be
concerned only with its own decisions and those of the House of
Lords. 4 5 Together, these constitute a binding body of national
law 146
The United States has very little truly national law A court in
one state is never bound by the decisions of a court in another state.
This is true even when a question of federal law is involved, such
as the interpretation of a federal statute or the meaning of a provi-
sion m the United States Constitution. 4 7 What the supreme court
of one state has to say about such a question may be interesting and
even persuasive to judges in another state, but they are entirely free
to adopt a contrary view The only court that can definitively settle
a federal question is the Supreme Court of the United States."6
scope of rights against itself, it is understandable that the courts should do so. But does not
the legislature have some responsibility for an initial determination of the scope of such
rights, subject to judicial review9 See later civil rights statutes, e.g., 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000a-2005f
which are narrower and more detailed than the earlier statute.
143. 28 U.S.C. § 44 (1976).
144. KLEIN, supra note 46, at 14.
145. But see note 127 supra.
146. But see A. KIRALFY, supra note 3, at 82-86, 116-17.
147. See J. GRAY, TaE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 243 (2d ed. 1921).
148. H. ABRAHAM, TaE JUDICIARY 18 (2d ed. 1969).
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The eleven United States Courts of Appeal are similarly powerless
to settle authoritatively federal questions.'49 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit can make decisions that are
binding on the federal courts within the Fourth Circuit, but they
need be given no effect in the Second, or Fifth, or Ninth Circuits,
and they are not binding even on state courts within the Fourth
Circuit. The result is that at any given time, there are conflicting
interpretations in various parts of the nation of what is, in theory,
national law In fact, it is not national law until the Supreme Court
of the United States has spoken.'50
The Supreme Court of the United States, however, is not creating
nor capable of creating an adequate body of truly national law
Despite its nine judges, its numerous law clerks, and its large staff
of secretarial, clerical, and administrative helpers, it renders opin-
ions in only about 125 cases a year on the merits.'"' Hundreds of
questions of federal law remain unresolved on a national level.'5 2 A
federal statute that means one thing in California may mean some-
thing quite different in New York. A federal constitutional provision
that means one thing for the federal courts of the Fourth Circuit
may mean the opposite in some of the state courts within that
circuit and in federal courts located elsewhere. Unless and until
radical changes are made, the United States will continue to suffer
from the lack of a coherent and adequate body of national law such
as England enjoys.' 3
The fact that the English Court of Appeal concerns itself only
with national law does not reveal fully how few decisions it has to
worry about, compared with the number of decisions that can be-
devil a typical American appellate court. That is because most Eng-
lish decisions are never published.' 54 Almost all decisions of the
149. See Address by Shirley Hufstedler before Fellows of the American Bar Foundation
and the National Conference of Bar Presidents (Feb. 3, 1974), partially reprinted in IV
APPELLATE JUSTICE: MATERIALS FOR A NATIONAL CONFERENCE (1975) [hereinafter cited as Huf-
stedler Address].
150. But cf. 1973 LAw & Soc. ORD. 543 (Arizona Supreme Court holds 4-3 decisions by
United States Supreme Court not binding m Arizona.).
151. See Haines, supra note 76.
152. See Address by Senator Hruska to National Conference on Appellate Justice (Jan. 26,
1975), reprinted in 121 CONG. REc. S1,555 (1975).
153. See Hufstedler Address, supra note 149.
154. D. KARLEN, supra note 6, at 87; see also A. KIRALPY, supra note 3, at 79-82; R. WALKER,
supra note 8, at 139-42.
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Court of Appeal are delivered orally and extemporaneously After
being taken down in shorthand and transcribed, they are not auto-
matically published, as they would be if rendered by an American
court. If they merely apply well-settled principles of law to specific
fact situations, they are not deemed of sufficient importance to be
cited as precedents and hence are not considered worthy of publica-
tion in the Law Reports.' 5 Only about twenty-five percent of the
decisions of the Civil Division of the Court of Appeal and ten per-
cent of those of the Criminal Division are published." 6 Not all of the
decisions of even the House of Lords are published. The conse-
quence is that the bulk of English case law increases at a much
slower pace than the bulk of American case law Published Ameri-
can case law grows at the rate of hundreds of volumes a year,
whereas English case law grows at the rate of about three volumes
a year.
The choice of which English decisions are to be published in the
law reports is not made by the judges themselves, but by persons
who are trained as barristers and called "law reporters."" 5 Their job
is to select and edit the opinions they think worthy of preservation
as precedents. The editorial work they do on an opinion after it is
announced is somewhat similar to that done by an American law
clerk before an opinion is promulgated. They check citations, verify
names, dates, and places, eliminate redundancy, and generally clar-
ify and improve the style without changing the meaning of the origi-
nal version. Then they submit the finished product to the judge who
rendered the opinion for his approval and whatever changes he con-
siders necessary Often he makes no changes because he is satisfied
that his views have been accurately and grammatically set forth.'
STARE DECISIS
Once an English precedent has been established it carries a bind-
ing force greater than that of any American precedent. The doctrine
One copy of the transcript of the, shorthand notes of every oral judgment is filed in the Bar
Library and is available for inspection by the legal profession and the public, so that non-
publication in the Law Reports is [unfortunately in the eyes of the English courts] not a
guarantee that an unreported decision cannot be used. It is not very often that it is, but under
the doctrine of stare decisis, it is theoretically as binding as a reported case.
155. D. KARLEN, supra note 6, at 88.
156. Id. at 87.
157. K. EDDYy, supra note 1, at 123. See also A. KnIALx, supra note 3, at 79-80.
158. D. KARLEN, supra note 6, at 103.
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of stare decisis is taken more seriously in England than in the
United States. In the United States any appellate court can overrule
its own previous decisions, and the power to do so is freely used by
some courts. In England the Court of Appeal cannot overrule its~own
previous decisions.'58 They can be changed only by act of Parliament
or reversed in the House of Lords.
Until 1966 the Law Lords felt similarly bound, but in that year
the Lord Chancellor announced that henceforth they would feel free
to depart from a previous decision when they deemed it proper and
just to do so.'8 0 Despite this announcement, however, no great
change has materialized.'"' English judges, including those who
comprise the Appellate Committee of the House of Lords, are still
imbued with the idea that their function is not to make or remake
the law, but simply to apply existing law 162
The difference between the American and English doctrines of
precedent is traceable in large part to the constitutional cases we
have already discussed. Constitutional provisions are extremely
hard to change by way of formal constitutional amendments. They
are vague, consisting in large part of such undefined concepts as
"due process" and "equal protection." This combination presents
an almost irresistible challenge to American judges. They feel that
they have no choice but to interpret constitutional language in a
different way than they would interpret language found in a con-
tract or lease or even a statute. Their function, they believe, is to
give content to majestic and unchanging generalities as applied to
concrete situations and to constantly reexamine old solutions in the
light of new problems and new attitudes toward them.'63
Constitutional interpretation, in other words, leads to an erosion
of the traditional doctrine of stare decisis. Precedent becomes less
important than current policy For this reason, the Supreme Court
of the United States can be more easily understood as a legislative
body than as a judicial tribunal. It operates according to judicial
procedure but functionally it is more like a super legislature. This
159. Young v. The Bristol Aeroplane Co., [1944] K.B. 718 (cited in R. JACKSON, supra note
2, at 13).
160. Statement of Lord Gardiner reported at [1966] 3 All E.R. 77, [1966] 1 W.L.R. 1234.
161. R. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 12. Cf. Templeman, supra note 108, at 19.
162. See note 108 supra; see also Templeman, supra note 108, at 19.




is revealed most vividly when it overrules a case prospectively, as it
does occasionally, saying that the new rule it is announcing for the
first time does not apply to the case at hand, but only to future
cases. ' 4
The approach of the Supreme Court to constitutional issues is not
confined to that court or to constitutional issues. It spreads to other
appellate courts, both state and federal, and it is followed even
when there are no constitutional implications. Although trial judges
still feel obliged to abide by precedents established by tribunals
above them, appellate judges generally feel free to depart from their
own precedents whenever they seem to have outlived their useful-
ness. They are determined, it seems, to correct old errors and to
adapt the law to new conditions and changing attitudes. Many ex-
amples could be cited, but I shall mention only two recent ones. In
1973, the Florida Supreme Court abolished the doctrine of contribu-
tory negligence and replaced it with the concept of comparative
negligence. 5 This was a revolutionary change in the common law
of torts. It could equally well have been accomplished by legislative
enactment, as happened in many states.'66 In 1976, the Supreme
Court of California decided that a woman who lived with a man
without being married to him could sue him for half of his property
(California is a community property state) and for future support
on the theory of an express or implied promise that he would treat
her as if they were married instead of "living in sin."'67 This was a
very material change in the law of contracts and domestic relations.
It went a long way toward abolishing in California the legal distinc-
tion between a wife and a mistress.
This is not to suggest that American law is in such a constant
state of flux that it is totally unpredictable or that every decision is
controlled by the passing whims of the judges. That would be far
from true. Nevertheless, the fact remains that all of our law is con-
164. Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719 (1966). See Schaefer, The Control of
"Sunbursts" Techniques of Prospectwe Overruling, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv. 631 (1967).
165. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
166. W PROSSER, ToRTs § 67 (4th ed. 1971).
167. Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. 3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976). Cf. Javins
v. First Nat'l Realty Co., 428 F.2d 1071 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (construing lease as ordinary con-
tract, disregarding certain real estate aspects); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 217 N.Y.
352, 111 N.E. 1050 (1919) (extending liability to manufacturer of objects reasonably certain
to imperil safety when negligently made, creating duty to inspect components; first "products
liability" case).
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stantly subject to change by judicial decision.
Nor should one infer that English judges never make law or that
they are confined in a strait-jacket of precedent. 6 ' Although they do
not go in for major reconstruction and renovation of the law, they
make law interstitially by filling in gaps to take care of situations
not covered by legislation or earlier decisions. They distinguish ear-
lier decisions and extend others by analogy 16I They feel free to
choose between earlier decisions that are in conflict with each other,
and even between divergent opinions in the same case. 7" Since each
judge ordinarily delivers his own opinion, there may be several
statements from which, at a later date, the judges may select a ratio
decedendi for the case at hand. 7' Finally, the precedents with which
they deal, being couched in terms of broad principles of law, rather
than in terms of their application to particular fact situations, allow
the judges considerable leeway in applying them to varying fact
situations.7 2 In short, the common law of England is still changing
and developing, but the rate of growth is gradual.
Compared to the relative stability of English law, American law
is very fluid. It moves not so much like a glacier as like a river. The
entire body of American law-every bit of it-is subject to constant
change, and change can be effectuated by judicial decisions alone
without the necessity of legislation or constitutional amendment.
Many an American decision has turned out to be like an excursion
ticket on a railroad-"good for this trip on this day only ,,,73
LITIGATION VS LEGISLATION
In England, where judges consider their job to be that of deciding
specific disputes according to generally known rules, litigants and
the lawyers who represent them act accordingly They bring to court
only disputes, not general problems of law reform. In the United
States, where judges think of themselves not only as dispute deci-
ders but also as lawgivers, policy makers, and problem solvers, law-
yers and litigants bring them all the various kinds of work they have
168. See generally R. WALKER, supra note 8, at 117-27. E.g., K. EDDEY, supra note 1, at
118-22; D. KARLEN, supra note 6, at 86-87; A. KiRALFY, supra note 3, at 72-73.
169. D. KARLEN, supra note 6, at 82.
170, Id.
171. Id. at 86-87.
172. Id. at 86.
173. See Smith v. Allright, 321 U.S. 649 (1944) (Roberts, J. dissenting).
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shown themselves willing to undertake.
The American conception of the judicial function is a powerful
stimulant to litigation, for it means that litigation becomes an alter-
native to legislation. For those who want some change in the law, it
is an attractive alternative for several reasons.'
First. courts are accessible to all, and they have no choice but to
listen to grievances, no matter how outlandish they may seem at
first glance. Legislative bodies are not equally accessible, particu-
larly if the person asserting a grievance stands alone without popu-
lar support or money or political clout. No legislator is under any
obligation to draft or introduce legislation which would cure the
grievance. However, the aggrieved person himself, as a litigant in
court, is able to introduce his own bill for relief in the form of a
complaint.
Second, unlike a legislative body, a court cannot mdefinitely
postpone decision of a difficult, question. It can never say the deci-
sion is too close to call or that it does not know the answer. It must
decide one way or the other, right or wrong, speaking with a degree
of confidence and authority that the judges may not feel in their
hearts.
Third, the judicial process is more open to public view than the
legislative process. To some extent, both courts and legislatures
operate behind closed doors, but the arguments presented in court
are always available for public scrutiny, and the opinions of the
judges are generally required to express not only their conclusions
but also the reasons for them.175 The same cannot always be said
about the legislative process. Lobbyists generally work in secret and
the legislative enactments they achieve often do not spell out the
real reasons behind them.
Finally, litigation, as expensive and burdensome as it has be-
come, is probably still cheaper and less burdensome than lobbying
to achieve the same result through legislative action. The risk of
losing a lawsuit is probably no greater than the risk of an unsuccess-
ful lobbying effort, and the financial consequences are less onerous.
174. Perhaps Americans need no stimulus. "[Ilt has always been a peculiarity of Ameri-
cans to turn to their courts for resolution of difficult problems. We go to great lengths
to find ways to cast any and every problem into the familiar pattern of a two-party adversary
trial and take it to court." Manning, Hyperlexis: Our Nattonal Disease, 71 Nw. U.L. REV.
767, 772 (1977).
175. STANDARDS RELATING TO APPELLATE Cous, supra note 92, at § 3.36 and commentary.
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Under the American system of costs, which is almost the exact
opposite of the English system of costs,'76 the losing party does not
have to pay the expenses of the other party but only his own.' Even
his own expenses may not have to come out of his own pocket, for
the lawyer who represents him may be working on a contingent fee.
In England, contingent fees are prohibited, 178 but here they are very
common.7 9 If a contingent fee is not involved, the litigant's expenses
may be bankrolled by the American Civil Liberties Union, the Na-
tional Association for the Advancement of Colored People, a labor
union, a trade association, a consumer group, an environmental
group, or some other form of publicly or charitably financed legal
aid.'1" Some of the organizations that assist litigants exist mainly or
even exclusively for the purpose of changing the law through litiga-
tion. They may have little interest in the particular cases in which
they become involved, but great interest in the broad social, eco-
nomic, or political problems they present, and in the possibility of
achieving law reform through judicial decisions.
Because litigation has become a viable alternative to legislation,
litigants and their lawyers are encouraged to assert claims and de-
fenses that have no existing foundation in statute or case law and
to persevere in their contentions through trial and appeal. If a stat-
ute or a prior decision stands in their way, they need not be disheart-
ened. Perhaps the statute will be declared unconstitutional or the
prior decision overruled.
In discussing dinosaur cases, the ones designed to make or remake
176. The American and English approaches are fundamentally different and
are indeed irreconcilable. Because there is no system of civil aid in the United
States, contingency fees are permitted .In England on the other hand, civil
aid is available, subject to two important limitations. First, the litigant must
be sufficiently poor to qualify financially, though he may be required to make a
contribution to the legal aid fund as a condition of obtaining the assistance.
Secondly, he must show that he has reasonable grounds for taking, defending
or being a party to the action
[I]n England costs normally follow the event, that is, costs are paid by the
loser, although after the court has 'taxed' the costs (that is, decided which costs
should be recoverable) the winner usually recovers about 80% of his actual costs.
Leggatt and Williams, supra note 54, at 189.
177. Rosenberg, Contemporary Litigation in the United States, in LEGAL INsTrrTiONS
TODAY 152, 162 (H. Jones ed. 1977) [hereinafter cited as Contemporary Litigation].
178. R. WALKm, supra note 8, at 218 (citing Wallerstein v. Moir, (No. 2) [19751 Q.B. 373,
[1975] All E.R. 849).
179. Contemporary Litigation, supra note 177, at 154, 164-65.
180. Id. at 154. Cf. note 176 supra.
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the law, I did not mean to imply that American courts do not have
their share of cases of human size. Proportionately, they have as
great a share of such cases as the English Court of Appeal, but these
ordinary cases too often have to be shoved aside in American courts
to make room for the dinosaur cases.' 1 This contributes to public
dissatisfaction with our courts. Litigants standing in line to have
their ordinary disputes resolved sometimes have to wait so long that
they go away in disgust.
Also contributing to popular dissatisfaction is the fact that judi-
cial problem solving does not always yield happy results. Sometimes
a general problem presented for judicial determination is not solved
but is merely defined and discussed. Even if it is solved, one seg-
ment of the public is likely to be happy with the solution and an-
other segment, perhaps equally large or larger, unhappy with it.
Just as in ordinary litigation, the losing side is likely to be disap-
pointed. Whether a general problem of law reform is solved or not,
public expectations of the courts have been raised, only to be disap-
pointed. 182
Despite dissatisfaction with their courts, Americans are ambiv-
alent in their attitude toward them. They still rush headlong into
them with all their problems and grievances. 1 Continually adding
new judges and creating new courts does not seem to help much.
The United States is in the midst of a law explosion which is shaking
the foundations of the judicial system.14
In England, too, there is popular dissatisfaction with the admin-
istration of justice,1' but whether it is as deep and widespread as
here is hard to say Certainly one of the causes of American dissatis-
faction is not present in England. Dinosaur problems that absorb
so much of the American courts' time, and yet yield results that are
so often disappointing, are not brought to the courts in England.
181. An American View, supra note 110, at 68.
182. Id. at 54; Rosenberg, Devising Procedures That Are Civil to Promote Justice That is
Civilized in NATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE CAUSES OF POPULAR DISSATISFACTION wrrH THE An.
MINISTRATION OF JUSTICE 86, 183 (1976).
183. "[I]t is a fact of life that in the United States all social and political issues sooner or
later seem to become judicial!" H. ABRAHAM, supra note 148, at 18. See also Hufstedler, New
Blocks for Old Pyramids: Reshaping the Judicial System, 44 S. CAL. L. Rav. 901, 901 (1971).
184. Cf. Manning, supra note 174, at 767 ("we are drowning in law").
185. See generally K. EDDEY, supra note 1, at 166-77; R. JACKSON, supra note 2, at 564-92;,
Leggatt & Williams, supra note 54, at 185-210. See also N.Y. Times, Mar. 19, 1979, at 38,
col. 1.
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They are brought instead to Parliament which has better facilities
for handling them. Parliament cannot duck these problems by pass-
ing them on to the courts in the same way that legislative bodies
can duck them in the United States. If Parliament fails to act or if
it acts improperly, the English public knows exactly where to place
the blame and how effectively to express its displeasure. Mean-
while, the English courts are allowed to carry on their normal work
undisturbed.
CONCLUSION: IMPORTS FROM ENGLAND 9
Now, with some background on the English Court of Appeal, we
ought to consider whether there are any souvenirs to bring home,
any ideas that might improve the functioning of American courts.
Obviously the United States cannot adopt the English approach
wholesale because that would revolutionize the system of govern-
ment. The Constitution would have to be abandoned, the fifty
states dismantled, the legal profession reorganized, the methods of
selecting judges changed, and so forth. What we might do, however,
is consider a few modest importations.
How about a little more orality and a little less emphasis on paper
work? Might it not be possible to extend the time for oral argument,
and m some cases to dispense with written briefs? Might it not be
possible to decide simple cases from the bench without elaborate
written opinions ?
How about publishing fewer opinions than at present? That
would slow the rate of growth in our case law and ultimately reduce
the time spent in research and litigation and the costs to litigants.
How about raising the standards of advocacy9 That would only
require the restriction of the argument of appeals to lawyers who
were able to demonstrate skills beyond those needed to pass bar
examinations.
How about rendering unto the legislature the things that are the
legislature's and unto courts the things that are the court's9 Much
law reform now undertaken by the courts can be accomplished by
Congress and the state legislatures.
How about taking stare decisis a little more seriously9
The ideas mentioned are not alien to the American legal culture
or incompatible with the goal of deciding appeals fairly and effi-
ciently Every one of them is presently being tried in some American
[Vol. 21.121
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appellate court or being seriously urged by a respectable number of
responsible members of the legal profession.'86
It is hoped that this examination of the English Court of Appeal
has revealed something more than a colorful spectacle for there are
indeed valuable examples of judicial efficiency and effectiveness
presented which should not go unnoticed.
186. Retention and extension of oral argument practice is advocated in P CARRINGTON, D.
MEADOR & M. ROSENBERG, JUSTICE ON APPEAL 16 (1976) [hereinafter cited as JUSTICE ON
APPEAL], although the authors do favor voluntary waiver of oral argument when all parties
agree to a waiver. Cf. A.B.A. COMMISSION ON STANDARDS OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION, STAN-
DARDS RELATING TO MANAGEMENT OF APPELLATE CoumRS § 2.50, recommending denial of oral
argument only if calendars are crowded, but allowing parties to show that oral argument is
necessary.
The use of briefs is probably firmly entrenched in American practice, but their purpose
could be served through other means. Less formal briefs, in terms of technical printing
requirements and substantive requirements, could be as useful in informing judges of the
issues. Professor Leflar suggests revision of briefing rules to allow letters from counsel in
simple cases. R. LEFLAR, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF APPELLATE COURTS 28 (1976)
[hereinafter cited as LEFLAR].
Summary decisions have been the subject of experiment in several circuits, but the deci-
sions are limited by rule to affirmances made after the judges study briefs, not after oral
argument. See Haworth, Screening and Summary Procedures in the United States Courts of
Appeals, 1973 WASH. U.L.Q. 257 (1973). The Commission on Revision of the Federal Court
Appellate Systems recommends the expression, "whatever the form" of the reasons for any
decision, and suggests that in some cases informal memoranda would be sufficient. UNrrED
STATES COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND
INTERNAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 50-51 (1975). The step between
"informal memoranda, intended for the parties themselves," id., and oral opinions delivered
from the bench seems a small one.
Related to the delivery of shorter opinions is the issue of publication. A standard for
publication has been formulated by the Advisory Council for Appellate Justice and is recom-
mended by LEFLAR, supra, at 57-58. Carrington, Meador, and Rosenberg combine the no-
publication issue with the memorandum opinion suggestion, citing the difficulties attaching
to the no-publication rules encountered by circuits attempting to utilize it. JUSTICE ON
APPEAL, supra, at 35-40. The issue is further discussed in Joiner, Limiting Publication of
Judicial Opinions, 56 JuD. 195 (1972) and Jacobstem, Some Reflections on the Control of the
Publication of Appellate Court Opinions, 27 STAN. L. REv. 791 (1975).
Advocacy standards are discussed in Burger, supra note 36, Kaufman, supra note 36, and
suggestions for special examinations have been forwarded by a committee of the Judicial
Conference of the United States.
The legislative activities of courts are criticized in BICKEL, supra note 102, at 175; Rifkind,
supra note 113; and Cox, supra note 163, at 828, quoting J. THAYER, JOHN MARSHALL (1974).
A differing opinion of the usefulness of stare decisis is presented in Wise, The Doctrine of
Stare Decisis, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 1043 (1975).
